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Abstract 
This paper investigates the ratio of general long-term debt to general capital assets’ 
influence on municipal credit ratings – signals of risk to investors – and coupon rates.  Given 
current uncertainty levels in credit markets, it is paramount that low risk be signaled to sell debt 
and maintain the lowest possible debt costs for municipalities.  It has been found that the 
GLTD:GCA ratio significantly influences credit ratings, but not coupon rates.  Because this 
research and prior studies indicate that credit ratings affect coupon rates, findings suggest that 
management should explore using this ratio as a metric for municipal financial condition.  It also 
shows that unrestricted cash and cash equivalents, the ratio of bonded debt outstanding to taxable 
assessed valuation, and local economic conditions are significant factors for both points of 
interest.  By monitoring these variables and developing strategies to control and influence them, 
favorable credit ratings will be obtained leading to lower coupon rates and debt service 
requirements.  The expected end result is increased available funds for critical public services.   
Introduction 
 
Due to the limited availability of cash to finance large capital projects, debt issuance is 
essential to government operation.  As governments issue debt, various costs are incurred with 
the most significant being the debt service costs required for repayment.  Debt issued for general 
purposes in the form of general obligation bonds is repaid from general tax revenues thus 
drawing on public funding streams and impacting requisite tax rates.  A sample of thirteen 
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metropolitan and consolidated governments revealed that, on average, municipalities are 
dedicating approximately nine percent, or $113 million, of their 2007 annual operating budgets 
for debt service.  It is critical that finance managers minimize borrowing costs.  For this 
minimization to occur there must be a method to analyze the variables contributing to borrowing 
costs.  Implicit in this is the rating on debt issues assigned by the following credit rating 
agencies.  These ratings indicate the relative financial risk assumed by bondholders.  This risk is 
seemingly higher now given uncertainty in national credit markets thus making ratings more 
important.  Assuming that investors are risk averse, they will require higher interest rates on 
riskier bonds to compensate them for the increased loss probability.  By understanding credit 
rating and coupon rate determinants, public financial managers may develop strategies to 
enhance their respective governments’ financial positions and ultimately reduce debt service 
burdens. 
 One method of monitoring financial risk is the use of debt ratios. Three commonly-used 
ratios exist in public finance: debt service payments to total operating expenditures; outstanding 
debt per capita; and outstanding debt to assessed valuation.  Absent from this sequence is a 
measure of government’s independent collateral and ability to support debt with current assets.  
This paper explores such a measure, the ratio of general long-term debt (GLTD) to general 
capital assets (GCA), and determines whether or not it is a significant predictor of borrowing 
costs, credit ratings, or both.  Should this value prove to be significant, then it may be used to 
show if a government has adequate capital to support its debt. 
This research benefits numerous stakeholders.  For analysts, it may serve as a measure of 
government default risk.  The public could use this information to hold government finance 
officials accountable for their management of public funds and asset accumulation.  Further, 
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comparable municipalities may utilize the ratio and the remainder of the analysis to better 
influence debt management policies and thereby reduce borrowing costs.  This will ultimately 
allow them to utilize the previously restricted dollars for other purposes.   
Review of Literature 
Financial ratios and indicators have widely been used to monitor overall financial 
position with the ratio of total debt to total assets determined by financial analysts to be the 
second most significant debt ratio for private sector finance (Gibson, 1987).  Private entities are 
permitted to freely use assets largely as managers and shareholders see fit.  In government 
finance, assets are restricted based on funding source; those held in enterprise or special purpose 
funds, for example, may not be used for general government operations.  This study has limited 
its scope to general long-term debt held in the form of general obligation debt and general capital 
assets, those held for general purposes.  Therefore, the ratio of general long-term debt to general 
capital assets (GLTD:GCA) is assumed to be a comparable measure to that used in corporate 
finance and is the topic of key interest.  The proposed GLTD:GCA ratio does not appear in any 
of the literature surveyed by the author. 
In addition to the GLTD:GCA ratio, other factors known to contribute to interest rates 
and credit ratings must be analyzed.  Previous studies have been surveyed to determine which 
factors to include.  Rubinfeld (1973) and Capeci (1991) both illustrate the importance of credit 
ratings in determining the cost of borrowing.  Rubinfeld notes an increase of 34 basis points in 
borrowing costs being attributable to a downgrade from an Aaa rating to a Baa rating; Capeci 
shows a decline of 115 basis points for an upgrade from Baa to Aaa.2  Therefore, it is essential 
that financial managers understand factors contributing to ratings since investors are using 
ratings to make decisions. 
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Moody’s, the oldest and most conservative of the major rating agencies, proclaims that 
municipal ratings are a function of four primary areas: the local economy, debt, financial 
condition, and administrative/managerial strategies (Moody’s, 2007).  Specific determinants and 
characteristics of each area are not provided, however.  Wagner (2004) addresses the economic 
assessment issue for state governments by using three variables: unemployment rate, real per 
capita personal income, and state general fund surplus.  Each of these regressors is found to be 
statistically significant.   
The second general area outlined by Moody’s, debt, is of primary consideration.  This 
category embodies nominal debt levels and financial policies regarding debt administration 
practices.  Vogt (1996) summarizes three standard debt measures: the ratio of debt service 
payments to total operating expenditures; outstanding debt per capita; and the ratio of 
outstanding debt to appraised valuation.  Johnson and Kriz (2005), Rubinfeld (1973), and 
Wagner (2004) show that public sector debt ratios are influential factors in predicting credit 
ratings and coupon rates.  Although none of the researchers evaluated the ratio of debt 
outstanding to appraised valuation, this measure is clearly relevant as it is the only one of the 
commonly used metrics that appears frequently in statutory debt provisions.   
 The third component, finances, has been monitored over time by multiple factors and 
ratios; one significant measure has been cash flows.  Cash flows figure into the debt conversation 
because dollars remaining following the payment of current liabilities are available to fund 
capital projects, service debt, or other priorities.  These dollars are regarded as free cash flows 
(FCF).  Thus, as indicated by Bush (2005), cash flow forecasting is essential.  These forecasts 
thereby influence credit ratings and borrowing costs by presenting evidence regarding an entity’s 
ability to meet its obligations and its capacity to accumulate additional long-term obligations.  
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However, Mills et al (2002) illustrate the riskiness of using free cash flow analysis due to 
uncertainty regarding its definition.  No studies were found that address the role of free cash 
flows in government operation, or their definition. 
The final major category considered by Moody’s is administrative and managerial 
strategies.  O’Toole and Meier (1999) show that management is important in public 
organizations as it influences organizational performance by altering system structure and 
developing strategies to address environmental threats and opportunities.  However, no studies 
have been found addressing managerial strategies in public finance.   
Beyond Moody’s explicit criteria, researchers have identified fiscal instruments that 
influence credit ratings and coupon rates.  Hsueh and Chandy (1989) examined the yield spread 
between insured and uninsured municipal debt and discovered that insurance is a significant 
factor in coupon rate determination.  Nanda and Singh (2004) later found that insurance is more 
beneficial for long-term bond issues than short-term issues; general obligation bonds are 
typically issued with long maturities.   
Beyond insurance, Johnson and Kriz (2005) examined a comprehensive listing of 
financial controls, or fiscal institutions, and their influence on the bond market.  They determined 
that balanced budget requirements and spending limits positively influence credit ratings.  
Further, they found that debt restrictions have an inverse impact on ratings and popular vote 
requirements are insignificant.  Johnson and Kriz (2005) also quantitatively demonstrated that 
interest costs are lowered indirectly by increasing credit ratings.   
Wagner (2004) further contributed to the body of knowledge with his examination of 
budget stabilization funds (BSF’s) and the political environment unique to each state.  He notes 
that states realized a 9.5 basis point reduction in long-term tax exempt bond yields after 
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instituting a BSF policy or law.  This evidence also shows that states with Democratic control of 
both the legislature and governorship pay more to borrow possibly due to investors’ fear of 
government obligations increasing under Democratic leadership.   
Empirical Methodology 
When studying municipal credit ratings, it is useful to determine which variables 
contribute most to attaining the highest possible rating for each bond issue.  An ordered logit 
model will be generated to estimate the cumulative probability of obtaining each of the following 
credit ratings: Baa; A; Aa; Aaa.  This is beneficial because the ratings are inclusive of their 
subordinates; that is, a rating of “A” encompasses a rating of “A2” and “Baa” as well.  This 
method was utilized by Johnson and Kriz (2005) for a similar study.  TABLE 1 outlines each 
variable included in the credit ratings model and the applicable data sources.  Of the independent 
variables included, all but three are pulled directly from the literature: the GLTD:GCA ratio; 
cash and cash equivalents; and administrative and managerial strategies.  Unrestricted cash and 
cash equivalents at year-end (hereafter referred to as “cash”) serves as a proxy for free cash 
flows because this amount is unencumbered as of the reporting date.  Administrative and 
managerial strategies reflect historic approaches to tight fiscal and environmental conditions.  
This measure is inherently qualitative.  For modeling purposes, a dummy variable reflecting 
changes in senior financial leadership will serve as a proxy.3  It is necessary to lag six variables 
one full time period (equating to one fiscal year): the GLTD:GCA ratio; cash and cash 
equivalents; debt outstanding per capita; change in state gross domestic product; change in local 
unemployment; and the change in local per capita income.  The ratio and cash values, because 
they are acquired from annually presented comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFR’s), 
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must be lagged.  Those measures used to assess local economic conditions are also lagged as 
they are released on an annual basis as well.   
Variable Source
GLTD:GCA
∆SGDP Change in State Gross Domestic Product Bureau of Economic Analysis
∆LUNEM Change in Local Unemployment Rate Bureau of Labor Statistics
∆LPCI Change in Local Per Capita Income Bureau of Economic Analysis
BDEBTOUT Bonded Debt Outstanding Per Capita Municipal CAFRs
BDEBTASSVAL Bonded Debt Outstanding to Assessed Valuation Municipal CAFRs
CASH
∆FINLEADERS Change in financial leadership
DEFSPENDING Deficit Spending permitted (1 = Yes; 0 = No) Survey of city personnel
DEBTLIM Legal limitation on debt amount (1 = Yes; 0 = No) Survey of city personnel
PUBLICREF Survey of city personnel
STATEIDEO State Political Ideology Medoff (1997)
BSF Budget Stabilization Fund required (1 = Yes; 0 = No) Survey of city personnel
TABLE 1
Variables Used in the Analysis
Model One: Credit Ratings
Description
Municipal CAFRs and 
communications with city 
personnel
Public referendum required for property tax 
increases (1 = Yes; 0 = No)
Ratio of General Long-Term Debt to General 
Capital Assets
Manual computation utilizing data 
from municipal CAFRs
Cash and Cash Equivalents for general 
government and proprietary type funds at 
fiscal year end
Manual summation utilizing data 
from municipal CAFRs
 
An ordinary multiple linear least squares regression model is used to estimate coupon 
rates.  Some past researchers utilized an alternative method – two-stage least squares, or 2SLS 
(Wagner, 2004; Johnson and Kriz, 2005).  Due to the variables selected and their covering each 
of the major areas of financial analysis, one may reasonably assert that all necessary variables 
have been included.  Thus, there is no reason to believe that the third assumption of ordinary 
least squares (that the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the error term) has been 
violated; this violation is commonly used to determine if 2SLS is the necessary procedure.   
TABLE 2 details the variables included in Model Two and the applicable data sources.  
As with Model One, all but three variables were pulled from the literature and the same six 
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variables will be lagged.  The other variables will either be determined simultaneously and 
immediately available for analysts and investors’ use.   
Variable Source
GLTD:GCA
CRATING
CASH
BDEBTOUT Bonded Debt Outstanding Per Capita Municipal CAFRs
BDEBTASSVAL Bonded Debt Outstanding to Assessed Valuation Municipal CAFRs
∆SGDP Change in State Gross Domestic Product Bureau of Economic Analysis
∆LUNEM Change in Local Unemployment Rate Bureau of Labor Statistics
∆LPCI Change in Local Per Capita Income Bureau of Economic Analysis
BONDINS Bond Insurance Utilized (1 = Yes; 0 = No) Survey of city personnel
BSF Survey of city personnel
MBI Lehman Brothers, Inc.
TABLE 2
Variables Used in the Analysis
Model Two: Coupon Rates
Description
Ratio of General Long-Term Debt to General 
Capital Assets
Manual computation utilizing data 
from municipal CAFRs
Moody's credit rating assigned to a given 
G.O. debt issue series
Municipal CAFRs; Official 
Statements for bond issues; 
Moody's official website
Municipal Bond Index Annual Value 
corresponding to issuance year
Cash and Cash Equivalents for general 
government and proprietary type funds at 
Manual summation utilizing data 
from municipal CAFRs
Budget Stabilization Fund in existence (1 = 
 
Research Findings 
Each model was determined to be a reliable estimation equation for the applicable 
dependent variable.  Between the models, however, there are substantial differences regarding 
which independent variables are reliable and significant predictors for credit ratings and coupon 
rates.  TABLE 3 displays the coefficient values within each model as well as overall model 
significance measures. 
 Model One, which estimates credit ratings, was found to be significant overall based on a 
chi square test.  The policy variable, the GLTD:GCA ratio, was found to be statistically 
significant within the model.  Thus, the GLTD:GCA figure is determined to contribute strongly 
to various assigned credit ratings. With each one percent increase in the ratio, a given  
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TABLE 34 
Regression Model Outputs 
    
  
MODEL 
ONE 
MODEL 
TWO 
MODEL 
THREE 
Estimation Technique: Ordered Logit OLS OLS 
        
Software: SPSS Eviews Eviews 
        
Dependent Variable: Credit Ratings Coupon Rates Spread 
        
Threshold       
Baa -17.058* - - 
  (3.281)     
Aa -11.756* - - 
  (2.679)     
Aaa -2.466 - - 
  (2.129)     
Independent Variables       
C - 2.764* 2.537* 
  - (1.144) (1.085) 
GLTD:GCA 0.024* 1.77E-06 0.004 
  (0.012) (9.84E-06) (0.003) 
DAaa - 0.358 -0.232 
  - (0.764) (0.765) 
DAa - -0.598 -0.714 
  - (0.778) (0.621) 
DA - -0.183 -0.651 
  - (0.756) (0.714) 
Cash 2.55E-006* -1.97E-06* -1.96E-06* 
  (0.000) (2.76E-07) (2.92E-07) 
BDebtOut 1.64E-005 -0.0001 -2.80E-06 
  (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
BDebtAssVal -1.359* 0.251* 0.198* 
  (0.331) (0.061) (0.051) 
∆ SGDP 2.09E-005 -3.13E-05* -2.95E-05* 
  (0.000) (6.57E-06) (6.65E-06) 
∆ LUNEM 0.157 0.104 0.122 
  (0.411) (0.147) (0.149) 
∆ LPCI 0.000 0.0004* 0.0004* 
                                                 
4 Coefficients for Model One reflect logged values as computed in the logit estimation.  TABLE 4 displays these 
figures converted to probabilities. 
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  (0.000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Bondins - -0.305 -0.156 
  - (0.315) (0.275) 
Debtlim -0.295* - - 
  (0.061)     
Defspending 9.905* - - 
  (2.517)     
BSF -0.601* -0.231 0.062 
  (0.186) (0.391) (0.047) 
Publicref -1.020 - - 
  (1.198) -   
MBI - 0.371 -0.635* 
  - (0.225) (0.239) 
State Ideology -0.100* - - 
  (0.033)     
∆ Financial Leadership -0.642 - - 
  (0.845)     
        
F-statistic - 29.113 29.800 
R2 0.736*** 0.776 0.780 
Adjusted R2 - 0.750 0.754 
    
* An (*) Denotes significance at the .05 level.  
** Standard errors are in parenthesis.   
*** Represents the Nagelkerke R2 value.  
 
municipality is 50.6 percent more likely to obtain the next highest credit rating (e.g., a rise from 
an "Aa" rating to an "Aaa" designation).5  Additionally, cash and the ability to finance current 
operating expenditures with debt are both shown to positively contribute to credit rating 
improvement.  The former is expected to be true as greater unrestricted cash amounts provide for 
more funds to be available for debt financing.  However, the latter must be rejected on theoretical 
and practical grounds.  Empirical research fails to validate such a coefficient sign and, 
practically, the option to use debt for operational funding encourages fiscal irresponsibility and 
spending beyond one's means.   
                                                 
5 Appendix A contains a table displaying probability transformations from the initial ordered logit output. 
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 Of the remaining independent variables, four are statistically significant: debt limit; 
budget stabilization fund requirements; state political ideology; and the ratio of outstanding debt 
to assessed valuation.  All of the aforementioned variables are accompanied by negative 
coefficients indicating that the likelihood of improving one's credit rating declines as the values 
increase. In terms of policies, one can see that lower debt limits and required budget stabilization 
fund balances as a percent of total general fund budget are beneficial for municipalities.  
Furthermore, containing debt to lower percentages relative to total taxable assessed valuation 
figures is fiscally prudent and beneficial.  Lastly, fiscal conservatism appears to be looked upon 
favorably by credit rating agencies; this is evidenced by the negative coefficient on the state 
ideology variable.  Thus, regardless of political preferences and party patterns, in terms of public 
financial management, it is in municipal governments' best interest to act conservatively. 
 Like Model One, Model Two, which estimates coupon rates, is found to be significant 
and reliable as a predictor based on an F-test and 77.6 percent of total variation being explained 
by the model.  This model shows the GLTD:GCA ratio as being statistically insignificant, unlike 
in the credit rating model.  Credit ratings, contrary to prior research findings, are also shown to 
be insignificant factors.  To delve deeper into both the policy variable and the credit ratings' 
insignificance, tests were conducted to see if the representation within the models cause the 
insignificance.  When considered collectively, GCA’s and GLTD are found to be jointly 
significant in coupon rate determination although the ratio of the two is not.  The same is true of 
credit ratings.  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that ratings in and of themselves are not 
influential, but when viewed as a group and compared to other municipalities' ratings, they 
contribute to the interest rates earned.   
 While the credit rating dummy variables show statistical insignificance in disagreement 
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with previous studies, other variables in the model are generally consistent with other 
researchers' findings.  The ratio of outstanding debt to assessed valuation and changes in state 
gross domestic product and local per capita income are all deemed to be significant and 
influential factors on observed coupon rates.  As expected, improvements in the ratio and state 
GDP contribute to lower coupon rates and ergo to lower debt service costs.  Unlike previous 
findings, however, the models generated within revealed that improvements in local per capita 
income result in higher coupon rates while local unemployment is statistically insignificant in all 
models.  Each of these results requires further investigation to determine if the results are 
brought forth due to measurement methodologies or other factors.  Finally, cash, the proxy for 
free cash flow, is found to be significant; higher cash stocks contribute to lower bond interest 
rates. 
Conclusions 
Two models have been provided to determine what, if any, influence the ratio of general 
long-term debt to general capital assets has on metropolitan governments’ bond credit ratings 
and coupon rates.  These models also produced figures showing the degree of influence that 
other relevant factors have on the two aforementioned categories.  The analysis reveals that the 
GLTD:GCA ratio is significant in determining credit ratings, but not in coupon rate assignments 
directly.  Thus, it follows that GLTD and GCA levels should be monitored closely and controlled 
so as to aid in obtaining favorable ratings.  These ratings should then yield lower debt service 
costs for metropolitan governments and ultimately allow funds to be appropriated for non-debt 
financing purposes.  The ideal outcome is that additional public initiatives may be funded or 
increased funding designated to successful programs and those in need. 
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 Further, higher levels of unrestricted cash and cash equivalents, the proxy for government 
free cash flow, are beneficial for metropolitan governments.  These deposits guarantee that 
funding is available to finance operating expenses in the event of crisis or unforeseen 
circumstances.  Budget stabilization fund requirements and debt limits follow a similar pattern; 
both are negative and significant in regard to credit rating determination.  As the legally required 
levels rise, the likelihood of obtaining a higher rating declines.  Additionally, it is shown that 
rating agencies favor fiscal conservatism.  Therefore, public managers are encouraged to develop 
minimum general fund balance policies and to be conservative in their behavior.   
 Similarly, metropolitan governments should adopt policies that regulate changes in ratios 
of debt to assessed valuation.  Increases in the ratio are found to be correlated with coupon rate 
increases, with a one percent increase in three Metro Nashville bond issues causing a debt 
service cost increase of $559,368.6  Finally, municipalities should continue funding economic 
development efforts when justified by solid benefit-cost analyses.  These practices should reduce 
debt service costs and provide for more unrestricted public funds as local economic conditions 
improve.   
                                                 
6 This calculation assumes that each issue has 30 years to maturity; interest is payable semi-annually; that the issues 
will not be called, refunded, or retired prior to the initial maturity date; and that the interest rate is fixed. 
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Appendix A 
 
Probability Estimates: Model One 
 
Variable Estimate 
Probability 
Transformation 
   
Threshold   
   
Baa -17.058 0.0000 
   
Aa -11.756 0.0000 
   
Aaa -2.466 0.0783 
   
Independent Variables   
   
GLTD:GCA 0.024 0.5060 
   
Cash 2.55E-006 0.5000 
   
BDebtOut 1.64E-005 0.5000 
   
BDebtAssVal -1.359 0.2044 
   
∆ SGDP 2.09E-005 0.5000 
   
∆ LUNEM 0.157 0.5392 
   
∆ LPCI 0.000 0.5000 
   
Debtlim -0.295 0.4268 
   
Defspending 9.905 1.0000 
   
BSF -0.601 0.3541 
   
Publicref -1.020 0.2650 
   
State Ideology -0.100 0.4750 
   
∆ Financial Leadership -0.642 0.3448 
   
 
